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THE LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL
INJURIES-THE DUTY TO PROTECT
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent expansion of the landlord's tort liability to include inju-
ries inflicted by third party criminals against tenants and their invitees
and licensees' is an area of law embroiled in controversy. Only in this
century have American courts been willing to impose a duty on a land-
lord to maintain and repair portions of leased premises under the land-
lord's control.' More recently, however, an accelerating trend away
from immunizing landlords and toward expanding their potential tort
liability has allowed tenants to recover for injuries resulting from foresee-
able criminal acts. In order for liability to be imposed, the tenant's injury
must be proximately caused by the landlord's breach of a duty. The
proximate cause requirement is fulfilled when the landlord's failure to
maintain the premises in a safe condition occasions the criminal act re-
sulting in injury to the tenant.
Courts have derived this new duty to provide security from several
different bases: the warranty of habitability implied in the lease, statutes
governing safety and security in multiple family dwellings, the special
landlord-tenant relationship, the landlord's contractual control over por-
tions of the premises, and the landlord's assumption of a duty to provide
security. Courts have expanded the landlord's liability to varying de-
grees, depending on which of the principles they chose to apply, as well
1. For brevity's sake, the term "tenant" will hereinafter be used to denote not only tenants in
privfty with the landlord, but also their families and those using the property in right of the tenant.
See generally J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 217 (2d ed. 1975). Regarding the
subject of privity of contract, the court in Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, -, 156 A.2d 252, 255
(1959) stated:
[lit is utterly unrealistic to say that when the head of a family leases premises and bargains
for an agreement on the part of the lessor to maintain them in good repair, the parties do
not recognize that the pact is in the interest and for the protection of members of his
household and others who enter thereon in his right.
Id., quoted in J. CRIBBET, supra, at 217.
2. See J. CRIBBET, supra note 1, at 205. The general rule was that there was no iniplied cove-
nant that the premises to be let would be in a tenantable condition, nor that the physical condition of
the premises should remain unchanged, except for waste, during the term of tenancy. In fact, even if
the landlord volunteered to make repairs, the landlord was not empowered to do so because the lease
gave the tenant exclusive possession, and that possession terminated the former right of the landlord
to enter the premises to ascertain defects and make necessary repairs. Id.
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as the strictness and exclusiveness of the application itself. Conse-
quently, some states require that landlords virtually insure their tenants'
safety, while other states leave tenants unreasonably vulnerable to crimi-
nal attack. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has avoided either extreme,
striking an equitable balance between the competing interests of land-
lords and tenants by applying a traditional tort negligence duty analysis.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LANDLORD TORT LIABILITY
A. Traditional Landlord Tort Liability
Medieval courts viewed the lease as a contract which effected the
conveyance of a property interest.3 The contract charged the landlord
with giving the tenant a legal right to possess the land free from interfer-
ence by the landlord or by third parties acting under the landlord's au-
thority,4 except when necessary to prevent waste or decay of the
premises.' The resulting landlord-tenant relationship gave rise to the
doctrine of caveat emptor, which relieved the landlord of any duty to
maintain the premises.6
Until the mid-twentieth century, the tenant was responsible for all
maintenance, repairs, and security regardless of whether the lease in-
volved residential or commercial property. If the parties intended other-
wise, the respective rights and obligations had to be expressed in the lease
itself.7
B. Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
With the advent of the industrial revolution, the leasehold market
3. Browder, The Taming of a Duty - The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REv. 99,
100 (1982) ("In fact, leases have always been contracts, which is not to say that every lease in the
past was also a contract.").
4. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 72 (2d ed. 1987). The
idea was that the tenant took the premises "as is." The landlord's principal obligations were to
deliver the land unencumbered and then to leave the tenant alone. Id.
5. J. CRIBBET, supra note 1, at 209. The lessee is obligated to treat the premises in such a
manner as to prevent any injury or substantial change in the property during the term, unless agreed
to otherwise. Id.
6. See Note, Landlord Liability for Criminal Acts Perpetrated Against Tenants: The Penn-
sylvania Approach, 91 DICK. L. REv. 779, 780 n.14 (1987) (citing 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
1260.3A (Rohan ed. 1986)). Although the landlord had no general duty to repair prior to com-
mencement of the tenancy, or maintain the premises during the tenancy, there were common law
exceptions to the caveat emptor rule. These included short term leases of furnished dwellings, leases
of buildings under construction, and fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of the condition of
the property. See also Stevens v. Pierce, 151 Mass. 207, 209, 23 N.E. 1006, - (1890); 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.45, 3.78 (1952).
7. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 4, at 72.
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shifted from largely unimproved agricultural lands to urban multi-sto-
ried apartment complexes and office buildings.' Courts began to recon-
sider the landlord's responsibility in light of the fact that an urban lease
had necessarily evolved into a contract for "a well known package of
goods and services."9
The modem-day lease is a complex instrument. The urban landlord
may have ongoing responsibilities to provide heat, air conditioning, trash
removal, parking facilities, and other amenities which far exceed the sim-
ple provision of raw land for farming purposes."0 In order to insure that
the needs of the urban tenant are met, courts have had to fashion new
doctrines, and legislatures have been forced to pass new laws.1"
Gradually, exceptions to the traditional rule of caveat emptor
emerged.1 2 The most generally adopted exceptions required landlords to
maintain premises under their control,13 disclose latent physical de-
fects,14 deliver the premises in a tenantable condition, 5 and exercise rea-
sonable care in repair when they had expressly covenanted to repair.1 6
8. See Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 443, 445
(1972).
9. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
10. For a general discussion of the complexity of the modem-day lease, see C. MOYNIHAN,
supra note 4, at 69-73. Moynihan states that the lease may also include elevator service, janitorial
service, repairs, window cleaning, lessor's reservation of right to terminate upon tenant's default or
breach, a definition of the rights of the parties in the event of accidental destruction, and various
other obligations of the landlord and tenant. Id.
11. See generally C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 4, at 76-77.
12. See Browder, supra note 3, at 102-05. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 399-412 (4th ed. 1971) (detailed discussion of tort liability in landlord-tenant law); Gees-
ing v. Pendergrass, 417 P.2d 322, 325 (Okla. 1966) (A landlord has the duty to use ordinary care to
maintain the common portions of leased premises.).
13. See Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 459 (Okla. 1986) (premises under the landlord's con-
trol may include not only the common areas which do not pass to the tenant, but also aspects of the
premises such as door and window locks or alarm devices, and all areas maintained for the tenant's
benefit). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.3 comment c (1977).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965). Section 358 provides that if the
landlord has or should reasonably have information about a dangerous condition and conceals it
from the tenant, the landlord will be subject to liability to the tenant for any physical harm resulting
from the condition. Id. Cribbet stated that courts could apply this exception to the caveat emptor
rule only when (1) the landlord had actual knowledge of such defect, (2) the defect was such that the
tenant could not be expected to discover it even upon reasonable inspection of the premises, and
(3) the landlord did not disclose knowledge of the defect. J. CRIBBET, supra note 1, at 205. See also
Borggard v. Gale, 205 Ill. 511, 68 N.E. 1063 (1903).
15. See, eg., Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Brown v. Southall Realty
Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968). (In both cases, unsafe and unsanitary conditions existing at the
commencement of the term which were known to the landlord voided a lease. Whereas the land-
lord's failure to disclose a latent defect affords a tort remedy, failure to deliver the premises in a
habitable condition affords the tenant a contractual remedy.).
16. For a discussion of the landlord's contract to repair and negligence in making repairs as it
relates to the landlord's tort liability, see Browder, supra note 3, at 104-05. The modem trend is to
3
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Under common law, courts considered the nonpayment of rent to be in-
dependent of the landlord's breach of a substantial covenant. Therefore,
the landlord who breached a substantial covenant, such as an express
promise to repair the premises, was still entitled to collect the full rent.
The tenant's sole remedy was to promptly vacate the premises, and then
claim constructive eviction.1 7
The case of Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 18 led the race to-
ward abandonment of the caveat emptor rule. The decision allowed a
breach of an implied warranty of habitability to be a defense to the land-
lord's eviction notice for nonpayment of rent. 9 The implied warranty of
habitability required the landlord to put and maintain the premises in
hold the landlord liable in tort for the tenant's injuries which are proximately caused by the land-
lord's breach of a contract to repair. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965).
Section 357 provides:
A lessor of land is subject to liability for physicial harm caused to his lessee and others
upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee by a condition of disrepair
existing before or arising after the lessee has taken possession if
(a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the lease or otherwise to keep the
land in repair, and
(b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land which the perform-
ance of the lessor's agreement would have prevented, and
(c) the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract.
Id.
17. L CRIBBET, supra note 1, at 206. Under landlord-tenant law, an express covenant to paint,
repair, etc. is not treated as a dependent substantial covenant whereby the landlord's performance
was a condition precedent to collecting the rent. Rather, landlords could collect the rent while
failing to keep their part of the bargain, unless the landlord's promise was expressed as a condition
precedent to the tenant's duty to pay rent. The lone traditional escape route for the tenant was the
doctrine of constructive eviction. Suppose, for example, that the landlord made an independent
promise to heat an office building and failed to do so. If the tenant protested and the premises
remained too cold to occupy, the tenant could move out promptly, claim constructive eviction, and
contend that no rent was due because of constructive eviction. Nevertheless, the tenants still acted
at their own peril because a court might later hold that the alleged breach was not so substantial as
to amount to constructive eviction. In such a case, the tenant remained liable for the rent. Id.
18. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). The Javins court charac-
terized the modem urban tenant as follows:
Today's urban tenants, the vast majority of whom live in multiple dwelling houses, are
interested, not in the land, but solely in "a house suitable for occupation." Furthermore,
today's city dweller usually has a single, specialized skill unrelated to maintenance work;
he is unable to make repairs like the "jack-of-all-trades" farmer who was the common law's
model of the lessee. Further, unlike his agrarian predecessor who often remained on one
piece of land for his entire life, urban tenants today are more mobile than ever before.
Id. at 1078 (footnotes omitted).
19. Id. at 1082. The tenants defaulted on rent payments alleging numerous violations of the
housing regulations. The court stated:
In our judgment, the old no-repair rule cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the
landlord by a typical modem housing code, and must be abandoned in favor of an implied
warranty of habitability. In the District of Columbia, the standards of this warranty are set
out in the Housing Regulations.
Id. at 1076-77 (footnotes omitted).
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such a condition as to meet the standards set out in the Housing Regula-
tions for the District of Columbia.2" The remedies for breach of the im-
plied warranty include termination or rescission of the rental agreement,
suit for damages, and the right to take a rent abatement.21
Prior to the abandonment of the caveat emptor rule, an important
principle developed in the tort law arena: the principle that an actor who
creates a situation which affords a third person the opportunity to com-
mit a crime against another might be liable for the injuries sustained as a
result of the third person's conduct. This principle is an exception to the
general rule that an intervenor's intentional act that is a substantial cause
in fact of the injury supersedes the original actor's negligence. In order
to find fault under this exception, the injured party must prove that the
original wrongdoer had prior actual or constructive knowledge of the
likelihood of the criminal conduct and consequent injury.22
This tort liability principle is best illustrated in the 1943 decision,
Neering v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.23 In Neering, a twenty-three
year-old woman was abducted from a train platform and later beaten,
robbed, and raped. Despite the woman's earlier complaints, the railroad
had taken no action to dispel tramps who continually loitered about the
station. Although the railroad was in compliance with the safety rules of
the Illinois Commerce Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court found
the railroad liable. The court held that the railroad could have reason-
ably anticipated the assault and taken reasonable precautions for the pro-
tection of its passengers.24 No evidence of previous assaults on
passengers is found in the facts of the opinion. Therefore, the court must
have considered the railroad's knowledge of mere loitering as adequate
20. 2 D.C. Register 47 (1955) (formerly designated the Housing Regulations of the District of
Columbia (1956)).
21. C. MOYNxHAN, supra note 4, at 80-81. If the tenant wishes to terminate the lease, the
tenant must first give notice and then vacate the premises. The tenant then ceases to be liable for
future rent, but will still be liable for the fair rental value of the defective premises during the term of
occupancy. The tenant, in seeking a rent abatement, will normally assert the breach as a defense in
recoupment or as a counterclaim to the landlord's suit for rent or eviction. Id.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965). Section 302B states:
An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it in-
volves an unreasonble risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third
person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal.
Id.
23. 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
24. Id. at -, 50 N.E.2d at 502-03. The court characterized vagrants as "offenders against good
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notice of the likelihood of a violent attack upon this woman and a suffi-
cient basis for imposing liability.
For almost three decades after Neering, the doctrine of caveat
emptor continued to immunize the landlord from any similar duty to
protect. Finally, in the 1970 decision of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave-
nue Apartment Corp. ,21 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held a landlord liable to a tenant for injuries inflicted
by a criminal intruder.
C. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.
In Kline, a woman sued her landlord for injuries sustained when she
was assaulted by an intruder in the common hallway of her apartment
building. Kline, a tenant of seven years, was satisfied with security meas-
ures in place at the beginning of her tenancy. During her tenancy,
though, Kline's landlord significantly reduced security personnel and
other security measures, resulting in increased criminal activity in and
from the common areas of the building.26
The Kline court began its opinion by recognizing the landlord's duty
to take protective measures to guard the entire leased premises as well as
the common areas.27 The court relied on the earlier ruling of Kendall v.
Gore Properties,28 a case of negligent hiring in which the landlord's em-
ployee attacked the tenant. The common rationale was that the landlord
had an obligation to secure the premises in order to protect tenants from
criminal attacks, whether perpetrated by employees or unknown intrud-
ers. The Kline court reasoned that the landlord, as a result of his control
over the premises, was the only party with the power to maintain and
secure them.29
The Kline court considered the special landlord-tenant relationship
to be a reasonable basis for imposing liability.30 This special relationship
25. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26. Id. at 479.
27. Id. at 482.
28. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969).
In Ramsay, an intruder forced his way into the tenant's apartment and attacked her. Prior to the
attack, the landlord had failed to install a lock on the front door, failed to replace the deceased full
time manager, and failed to take any action to prevent strangers from loitering in the building's
common areas. In determining whether the landlord was liable for criminal acts of third persons,
the court stated that the test is what is reasonable under all the circumstances. Id.
29. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481. The court also stated that the landlord is even better situated to
prevent injuries than the police who are neither equipped, manned, nor empowered to patrol the
expansive common areas of multiple family dwellings. Id. at 484.
30. Id. at 485.
[Vol. 24:261
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is akin to the innkeeper-guest relationship which courts traditionally re-
lied on to hold innkeepers liable for crimes committed against their
guests as a result of the innkeeper's breach of a duty to provide an envi-
ronment secure against intruders.3 ' Likewise, the landlord's duty arose
from "the logic of the situation itself"'32 because the landlord was the
only one in a position to take the necessary steps to protect the tenant.33
A duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances exists in all
special relationships.34 The Kline court held that in the landlord-tenant
relationship, the "reasonable" standard of protection should be "that
commonly provided in apartments of this character and type in this
community. 3
5
Finally, the Kline court relied on the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity theory applied in Javins.36 The Kline court expanded this warranty to
include an implied contractual obligation to provide reasonable protec-
tive measures which were within the landlord's capacity to provide.37
The modem multiple dwelling lease, when viewed as a rental contract for
goods and services, 38 entitled Kline to expect that the premises would be
maintained at the same level of security which existed at the commence-
ment of the lease.39 When the landlord reduced the number of security
personnel, criminal activity increased. The landlord essentially rendered
the premises unsafe and therefore uninhabitable. Consequently, the
landlord's nonfeasance constituted a breach of an implied contractual
duty to maintain the premises in a safe and secure condition.'
31. Id. at 482.
32. Id. at 483.
33. Id. at 484.
34. Id. at 483. In other similar relationships, the court stated, "a duty should be imposed upon
the one possessing control (and thus the power to act) to take reasonable precautions to protect the
other one from assaults by third parties which, at least, could reasonably have been anticipated." Id.
35. Id. at 486.
36. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970).
37. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 485-88 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 481. The Kline court's reliance on the contractual nature of the lease was best ex-
pressed by the court's quotation of Javins in characterizing the modem urban lease as "a well known
package of goods and services - a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also
adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper
sanitation, and proper maintenance." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074).
39. Id. at 485.
40. Id. (citing Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079). But see Comment, Landlord Liability for Crimes
Committed By Third Parties Against Tenants, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 181, 189 n.42 (1986) (discussion
of serious flaws in the majority opinion as pointed out by the dissenting judge. Kline was a month-
to-month tenant at the time of her attack). Consequently, there could be no breach of contract
because there was no reduction in security during that month preceding the attack. Kline, 439 F.2d
at 492 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Judge MacKinnon also noted that one single instance of assault
and robbery was insufficient to support the forseeability of like crimes. Id. at 489.
1988]
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D. Developments After Kline
As a general proposition, the landlord-tenant relationship alone is
not a sufficient basis for holding the landlord liable for injuries tenants
sustain as a result of criminal acts by third parties.41 However, since
Kline, many courts have held a landlord liable for negligently failing to
implement protective measures or failing to maintain premises in a con-
dition which is safe and reasonably deters criminal activity.42 In addition
to the three theories espoused in Kline, courts have applied the assump-
tion of duty theory to extend the landlord's tort liability.43
In Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority," the court held that a se-
curity guard service which the housing authority had employed assumed
the duty of protecting the tenants.45 The assumption of duty theory gen-
erally limits the landlord's duty to protect tenants to the extent of the
landlord's undertaking to do so.4 6 Therefore, the court held the author-
ity could be liable only for negligent hiring.47 This theory entitled the
tenant to that level of security which could have been reasonably ex-
pected from the program offered by the security service.4"
In Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp.,4 the court relied on the
landlord's violation of an administrative regulation governing the condi-
tion of multiple dwellings as providing at least some evidence of negli-
gence.50 Two of the court's justices recognized the implied warranty of
habitability and the Kline theory, that the public interest was served by
41. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481. See generally Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant
Against CriminalActivities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3d 331,335 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
42. Note, The Foreseeable Risks of Apartment Living: Pennsylvania Defines a Landlord's Duty
to Provide Security, 31 VILL. L. REv. 627, 627-28 n.3 (1986).
43. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 167-68, 159 N.E. 896, 898
(1928). Chief Justice Cardozo best articulated this duty as follows:
If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that in action [sic] would commonly result, not
negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury,
there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward .... The query always is
whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as to have launched a force
or instrument of harm, or has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become an
instrument for good.
Id.
44. 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979).
45. Id. at-, 399 N.E.2d at 599-600.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at -, 399 N.E.2d at 600.
49. 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
50. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 85-86.
[Vol. 24:261
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requiring protection from the growing threat of crime, as potential justifi-
cations for imposing liability on the landlord."' Unlike the Kline and
Pippin courts, the Braitman court made no mention of a breach of war-
ranty as a prerequisite for applying the violation of a statutory duty the-
ory. 2 Because the regulation required installation of a "heavy duty lock
set equipped with stopwork for control of the knob and an additional
dead bolt or auxiliary latch bolt,"'5 3 and the apartment door locks were
either missing or nonfunctional, there was no need to address the implied
warranty of habitability theory. The basis for Braitman's negligence
analysis was that violation of a statute constitutes a rebuttable presump-
tion of negligence. A problem arises, however, where a statute includes
vague requirements that a building be kept "decent, safe, and sanitary." 4
Nevertheless, in such instances, some courts have imposed a statutory
duty on the landlord to protect the tenant, 55 while other courts have
ruled that such statutes are only applicable to physical defects. 6
Few courts continue to rely on the Kline "special relationship" the-
ory as an independent basis for imposing a duty on the landlord to pro-
tect tenants.5 7 Courts continue to apply common area 58 and warranty of
habitability59 theories, either in conjunction with other theories or, less
51. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 86-87.
52. Id. at-, 346 A.2d at 84-86. The court simply stated, "plaintiffs would have been entirely
justified in invoking the Multiple Dwelling Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder as evi-
dence of defendant's negligence." Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 86.
53. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 85.
54. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494
(1981) (landlord held liable for failing to repair defective lock based on landlord-tenant relationship);
O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977) (landlord
failed to protect tenant from a foreseeable rape and might be held liable based on a special relation-
ship between landlord and tenant); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224
N.W.2d 843 (1975) (landlord held liable for not taking reasonable protective measures to reduce risk
of harm posed by presence of mental patients on elevators).
58. See, e.g., Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977) (liability imposed for defective front
door based on common area theory); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976) (landlord
held liable for failing to secure areas under his control); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198
N.W.2d 409 (1972) (failure to secure common areas); Loeser v. Nathan Hale Gardens, Inc., 73
A.D.2d 187, 425 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (landlord must take reasonable precautions to
deter foreseeable criminal conduct in common areas).
59. See, eg., Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980)
(duty to maintain security services is founded on an implied warranty of security); Trentacost v.
Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980) (liability based on breach of warranty of habitability,
violation of a statute, or traditional negligence principles); Brownstein v. Edison, 103 Misc. 2d 316,
425 N.Y.S.2d 773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (essential security measures fall within the warranty of
habitability).
9
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frequently, as independent bases for imposing on the landlord a duty to
protect tenants from injuries inflicted by criminal intruders.
III. MODERN APPROACHES TO LANDLORD LIABILITY
Many states have shared in creating, expanding, and applying the
various theories of landlord liability, largely overthrowing the doctrine of
caveat emptor and the notion that a lease is a conveyance of property.
However, in some states the caveat emptor rule still operates as the land-
lord's cloak of immunity even when the landlord creates a situation
which affords a criminal the opportunity to harm a tenant. On the other
hand, some courts have stripped the landlord of all common law protec-
tions in their haste to remove the ancient cloak of immunity.
A. Assuming the Duty to Protect
Notwithstanding the pervasive and unpredictable nature of crime,
the landlord may create conditions which afford the opportunity for
third persons to commit crimes against tenants. In Pippin v. Chicago
Housing Authority,'° two security guards, employees of a contract secur-
ity service, witnessed yet failed to prevent the attack and murder of the
plaintiff's son in an apartment building lobby. 61 Despite the prevalence
of crime in the housing project, the court explained that the landlord was
obligated to protect tenants only to the extent of the landlord's voluntary
undertaking.62 Because the authority itself had not undertaken to pro-
vide the security, it could not be held liable for the possibly negligent
conduct of the security guards. 63 According to the court, the authority
could at most be liable for negligently hiring the guard service.64
Phillips v. Chicago Housing Authority65 involved a housing project
with a history of violent crimes. In this case, an attacker abducted a
young woman and took her to a supposedly closed-off floor where he
assaulted, raped, and murdered her.66 The court applied the Pippin
60. 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979).
61. The tenant had first requested the two security guards in the lobby to remove Pippin from
her apartment. Upon their refusal, she left the building but returned to the lobby a few minutes
later. Pippin then entered the lobby where he and the tenant became involved in an altercation.
Only after separating them did the guards realize that Pippin had been stabbed. Id. at -, 399
N.E.2d at 597-98.
62. Id. at -, 399 N.E.2d at 599.
63. Id.
64. The plaintiff alleged that the authority employed the service without proper investigation,
raising the possibility of negligent hiring. Id.
65. 89 Ill. 2d 122, 431 N.E.2d 1038 (1982).
66. Id. at -, 431 N.E.2d at 1039. The plaintiff alleged that there had been previous crimes of
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court's assumption of duty theory and held that the plaintiff did have a
cause of action against the authority for negligently performing its volun-
tary undertaking to close off and secure certain floors. The court limited
the duty of care imposed on the landlord to the extent of the landlord's
undertaking, which was to secure certain floors. The fact that the land-
lord did not assume a general duty to police the project did not preclude
the plaintiff's recovery for wrongful death.67 Apparently, in Illinois the
landlord's only motivations to provide security to tenants in an over-
crowded, crime-infested housing market are the landlord's own sense of
goodwill or the more practical opportunities to sell security as an addi-
tional benefit and raise rents.
In Feld v. Merriam,68 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a
bright line rule which essentially allowed landlords to decide not only
when they would assume the duty to protect, but also what the limits of
that duty were.69 The Felds, tenants in a large apartment complex, were
abducted at gunpoint from an adjacent parking garage. Prior to the at-
tack, the tenants' association complained to the landlords about the in-
crease in criminal activity despite the presence of trained doormen and
stationary and patrolling guards. The landlords refused to implement
the tenants' proposed security measures. The supreme court reversed the
superior court's affirmance of the trial court's judgment in favor of the
tenants, and admonished the superior court for departing from the gen-
eral rule that a person cannot be held liable for the criminal acts of third
parties.70 Furthermore, the superior court had failed to recognize the
crucial distinction between the risk of injury sustained at the hands of a
third party intervenor and that resulting from a physical defect. Accord-
ing to the supreme court, to impose a duty in the former situation
"would effectively require landlords to be insurers of their tenants [sic]
safety." '7 1
The Feld court found no general duty to protect tenants against
criminal intruders, unless the landlord provides or volunteers to provide
a program of security.72 The court defined a program of security as "an
rape in the closed-off areas, and that the keys to the closed-off floors were kept in a place that was
known and accessible to the general public. Additionally, elevators could be stopped at closed-off
floors. The authority had also failed to insure that the locks securing the floors were properly work-
ing to bar access. Id.
67. Id. at -, 431 N.E.2d at 1041.
68. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
69. Note, supra note 6, at 803.
70. Feld, 506 Pa. at -, 485 A.2d at 746.
71. Id.
72. Id. at -, 485 A.2d at 747.
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extra precaution, such as personnel specifically charged to patrol and
protect the premises."73 The Feld court never specified when the duty to
protect might begin.7 4 Whether the duty arises at the time the landlord
advertises or offers the program, at the commencement of the lease, after
partial installation or implementation, or only at the time of full program
implementation is not clear. Commentators have suggested that the Feld
court meant to impose a duty from the moment the tenant initially relied
on the promise to implement or at the actual implementation of a pro-
gram of security, whichever came first.75
The Feld court stated that a tenant may reasonably expect a pro-
gram of security to provide only those measures identified and offered as
part of the program and nothing more. The irony of the Feld court's
rationale is that a program of security need not effectively deter crime; it
need only be exercised in a non-negligent manner.76 The Feld decision
may have been an overreaction to a ruling in the neighboring state of
New Jersey77 which held that a landlord's duty of reasonable care to
guard against criminal activity may be based solely on an implied war-
ranty of habitability. 78
By applying the assumption of duty theory as a sole basis for ex-
panding the landlord's duty to include protection of tenants, courts have
potentially increased the tenants' susceptibility to criminally inflicted
harm. If liability is based solely on the negligent exercise of the land-
lord's security program, it follows that a landlord who offers nothing
incurs no duty to protect tenants. If this logic is taken to its extreme, the
landlord may foresee tragic consequences yet allow the continued exist-
ence of dangerous conditions which invite criminal activity in order to
insulate himself from liability. Moreover, when a tenant is attacked,
these courts will relegate this landlord to the status of a mere
"bystander." 79
73. Id.
74. The duty to provide a program may arise either when it is promised, or when it is imple-
mented. What about a test program or one that is never agreed to by the tenants? Is a landlord
liable for providing the full program as promised from the moment that the first phase is imple-
mented? In other words, when and how might a landlord "incur a duty voluntarily or by specific
agreement?" Id. at -, 485 A.2d at 747.
75. See Note, supra note 6, at 802-03.
76. Feld, 506 Pa. at -, 485 A.2d at 747.
77. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
78. Id at -, 412 A.2d at 443. The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first to recognize the
implied warranty of habitability as an independent basis for imposing liability on landlords for inju-
ries resulting from third party criminal acts. See generally Comment, Landlord Liability for Crimes
Committed by Third Parties Against Tenants, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 181, 199-200 (1986).
79. In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the
[Vol. 24:261
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B. The Warranty of Habitability
In Trentacost v. Brussel, 0 an assailant attacked and robbed a sixty-
one-year-old woman at the top of a common stairway inside her apart-
ment building. At the time of the attack, the building's front door had
no lock. Additionally, considerable criminal activity had occurred
within the vicinity of the apartment. The victim had reported an at-
tempted break-in on one occasion, and at other times had notified the
landlord about intruders in the hallways. In holding the landlord liable
to the tenant for her injuries, the court partially relied on the landlord's
contractual obligation, concluding "that the landlord's implied warranty
of habitability obliges him to furnish reasonable safeguards to protect
tenants from foreseeable criminal activity on the premises. "81 However,
many courts have limited the application of this rationale to cases with
fact patterns similar to that of Kline.82 Such facts would typically in-
clude a publicized security program with its cost reflected in higher than
average rents for comparable dwellings without such programs.
In Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., the predecessor to
Trentacost and also a deadbolt lock case, the court posited landlord lia-
bility upon traditional negligence theory. The court, however, declined
to resolve whether the implied warranty of habitability was "flexible
enough to encompass appropriate security devices." 84 In other words, in
the absence of housing codes which specify security systems, services,
and devices, the landlord is in a dilemma as to what measures might
reasonably deter a criminal. Furthermore, some commentators feel that
such omissions portend a tendency of juries to sympathize with the help-
less crime victim and view any safeguard short of insuring total safety as
less than reasonable under the circumstances."5
court stated that "[t]he landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety, but he certainly is no bystander."
Id. at 481.
80. 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
81. Id. at -, 412 A.2d at 443. The court also found liability on the alternative ground of
conventional negligence. Id. at 445.
82. See, eg., Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 100, 302 N.E.2d 207, 209
(1973); Gulf Reston Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974). See also Brown-
stein v. Edison, 103 Misc. 2d 316, 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Tynan v.
Willowdale Commercial Corp., 69 Misc. 2d 221, 222-23. 329 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696-97 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1972) (In the latter two cases, landlords assumed the duty to protect when they provided a minimum
level of security by installing security devices.).
83. 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
84. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 87. ("[W]hether the concept of an implied warranty of habitability of
residential premises... is flexible enough to encompass appropriate security devices ... is a question
we need not resolve today.").
85. See, e.g., Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 108 (D.C. 1980) (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
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The very nature of a warranty precludes the landlord's ignorance of
danger from being a defense to liability. As a result, the Trentacost deci-
sion correctly asserted that the injured party need not prove that the
landlord was on notice as to the risk of danger.8 6 The court viewed the
landlord's knowledge of, or ability to reasonably foresee, the dangerous
situation as irrelevant to finding a duty to protect. The elimination of the
notice requirement, however, de-emphasized the importance of foresee-
ability as a vital element in determining the scope of the duty and the
limits of proximate cause. Because the warranty theory operates on such
a loose notion of foreseeability, the landlord is subject to nothing short of
absolute liability for the criminal acts of third parties directed against
tenants. 7
Admitting the importance of foreseeability in finding a duty, the dis-
senting justice in Trentacost also stressed that "a fair balancing of the
relative interests of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public
interest in the proposed solution" are all vital elements of the inquiry.88
The court unreservedly imposed strict liability on landlords when it re-
jected these elements and embraced the warranty of habitability as a sole
basis for establishing a duty to protect tenants. The Trentacost ruling
may represent a response to the growing prevalence of crime in over-
crowded, inner-city housing projects.8 9 The court, in its haste to impose
But see Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 939 (1973) (There is sufficient flexibility in the standard of reasonable care applied for juries to
avoid harshness through the application of common sense in following the court's charge.).
86. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, -, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (1980). The court stated that
"[s]ince the landlord's implied undertaking to provide adequate security exists independently of his
knowledge of any risks, there is no need to prove notice of such a defective and unsafe condition to
establish the landlord's contractual duty." Id.
87. This decision could have been based entirely on traditional negligence theory since the en-
tire court concluded that the attack and subsequent mugging were a foreseeable result of the land-
lord's negligence. Id. at -, 412 A.2d at 441.
88. Id. at -, 412 A.2d at 447 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
89. The unique situation in New Jersey may have been an open invitation for the supreme court
to apply breach of warranty theory to expand the landlord's tort liability to include criminal acts
against tenants. Crime was prevalent in an overcrowded housing market. If a tenant vacated an
apartment because of lax security and criminal activities on the premises, the landlord might retain
the security deposit and immediately fill the vacancy from a waiting list of prospective tenants. The
landlord had no incentive to correct security deficiencies, and most tenants were not disposed or
empowered to do so. Then in 1968, the state legislature enacted a comprehensive building code
which provided that "[b]uilding entrance doors and exterior exit doors be equipped with heavy duty
lock sets." N.J.A.C. 5:10-6-6(d)(7) (also published in: Regulations for the Construction and Main-
tenance of Hotels and Multiple Dwellings, Article 605-3(f)(2)(ii)). In Trentacost, the court initially
established that the landlord's violation of the clear standard set out in the regulation constituted a
rebuttable presumption of negligence. At this juncture, the temptation to resort to breach of war-
ranty theory as a sole means of imposing a duty upon the landlord to protect his tenants proved too
great for the court to resist. Trentacost, 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 447 (Clifford, J., dissenting). See
generally Recent Development, Expanding the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: A
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a duty of protection on landlords, ignored the unfair implications for
landlords by applying the warranty theory.
The Trentacost decision presents yet another difficulty in that the
traditional contractual remedies available for a breach of warranty claim
are inappropriate when the tenant injured by a criminal intruder seeks to
recover in tort.90 The court circumvented this difficulty by recognizing
that when the landlord breaches the warranty, the tenant has the right to
deduct the costs of repairing a "vital facility" from the monthly rent.9
The court then categorized "provisions for the tenant's security" as a
vital facility.92
Relying on tort law, the court concluded that the warranty was
"flexible enough" to cover these provisions and that their omission con-
stituted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 93 Because the
minimum provisions for security were so clearly specified by the New
Jersey legislature, the court may have reasoned that a plaintiff could now
more easily furnish proof that the landlord had violated this clear stan-
dard. In other words, by applying the warranty of habitability theory,
the court expedited the imposition of a duty and thus simplified and
streamlined the tort recovery process.
Given vague statutory language, the lack of any relevant statute, or
a court's refusal to apply the statute, the landlord may be held liable for
all crimes committed on the premises whether the landlord could reason-
ably foresee them or not. In Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Investment
Trust,94 the United States district court found a breach of an implied
warranty in the absence of a statute. In that case, a contract security
guard reduced his evening patrol activities during the plaintiff's ten-
ancy.95 A criminal intruder attacked the tenant during this period. The
court held that an implied warranty to keep the premises in the same
condition of safety as existed at the inception of the lease was in effect.
Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1493
(1980) (the breach of warranty theory used for imposing a duty in Trentacost fails to delimit the
scope of that duty and the security standards which a landlord is required to maintain).
90. Recent Development, supra note 89, at 1518-19.
91. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, -, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (1980).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980).
95. Id. at 1160. The tenant was assaulted and raped when she surprised burglars in her apart-
ment. At the commencement of the lease term, a security officer was employed by the apartment
complex to patrol the area at night. Subsequently, the guard took a daytime job and acquired addi-
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The jury, therefore, could reasonably infer that the landlord failed to
maintain the premises in a safe condition.96
The Flood opinion's antithesis is demonstrated in a District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals case where the court refused to require the
landlord to increase security on the rationale that a tenant cannot require
an increase in security above that which existed at the inception of the
lease term.9 7 The landlord had already satisfied his contractual obliga-
tion which did not require him to insure the tenant's safety. The tenant's
proposed security measures were simply not part of the bargain.98
C. The Oklahoma Approach
No Oklahoma court addressed the issue of landlord liability for the
criminal acts of third parties until 1986. In Lay v. Dworman,99 a criminal
intruder assaulted and raped Lay inside her apartment. Even though the
landlords knew of criminal activities, including other rapes, in the apart-
ment complex, they failed to repair a defective lock on the sliding glass
door to Lay's apartment through which the attacker eventually gained
entrance.
The Lay court rejected Kline as unnecessarily expansive, defining
the duty as one "to use reasonable care to maintain the common areas of
the premises in such a manner as to insure that the likelihood of criminal
activity is not unreasonably enhanced."' l"° The duty is derived from a
combination of the landlord's contractual retention of control over the
premises, and the tort principle that a negligent actor's liability is not
always superseded by a third person's intentional tort. 101 The court
stated that the tenant first had to notify the landlord of a defect if the
96. Id. at 1160. The Flood opinion also found the landlord potentially liable for the tenant's
injury based on a breach of express warranty to maintain the agreed level of security during the term
of the tenancy. However, the court clearly stated that "[t]he jury could reasonably infer that the
defendants failed to maintain the level of security imposed at the beginning of plaintiff's lease term,
resulting in a breach of an implied warranty to maintain the conditions." Id. Under the implied
warranty theory and absent any statutory standard by which a jury might judge the landlord's con-
duct, it is doubtful that the jury was able to infer otherwise.
97. Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231 (D.C. 1971).
98. Id. at 232. The Williams court applied a version of Pippin's assumption of duty theory in
an action where the tenant merely sought a contractual remedy. The court first rejected the tenant's
violation of statute argument noting that the terms "safe" and "safety" did not refer to security
conditions. The tenant, living in a building where there had been numerous robberies and continu-
ous loitering, was denied a contractual remedy because the landlord had not undertaken to do any-
thing to alleviate the situation. The rationale was that proposed security measures would not be
covered by the tenant's rental payments and were therefore not part of the bargain. Id.
99. 732 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1986).
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landlord was not already aware of it.'" 2 Only then would an "extant
duty" flow from the landlord's knowledge of criminal activities and
knowledge of the defective condition."°3 The court continued by explain-
ing that the landlord's control over security aspects of the premises pro-
duced the tenant's reliance on the landlord to promptly correct defective
conditions which might endanger the tenant."°
The Lay court adhered to a traditional negligence analysis as it ad-
dressed the various theories upon which courts have imposed a land-
lord's duty to protect tenants. The court was firm in its rejection of the
Kline court's use of the landlord-tenant relationship as the sole basis for
expanding tort liability to the extent of making the landlord a "quasi-
guarantor of the tenant's safety."' 5 The court characterized the land-
lord's assumption of a duty to protect as either gratuitous, for considera-
tion, or arising out of the contractual nature of the lease. 106 In Lay, the
tort negligence analysis appears to settle the imbalance of landlord versus
tenant interests confronted in Pippin and Trentacost.
The Lay court, however, expressed an opinion on only one of the
two breach of warranty theories of recovery.107 The petition included
102. Id.
103. Id. at 459. The Lay opinion focused on traditional principles of negligence in the landlord-
tenant relationship as well as the landlord's duty to prevent the enhancement of opportunities for the
infliction of criminal acts upon tenants. This duty results from the merging of two duties: (1) The
landlord's obligation to exercise due care not to allow dangerous conditions to exist in those areas
over which the landlord has contractually retained control, and (2) the landlord's extant duty flow-
ing from knowledge of the dangerous condition or defect which might enhance the likelihood of
criminal activity directed at tenants. Id. at 458.
104. Id. See also Lambert, Tom on Torts, 30 ATLA L. RaP. 110 (1987). Lambert best tied the
principle of the tenant's reliance to the negligence analysis when he summarized the impact of Lay
as follows:
The bottom line in Law [sic], supra, is to add to the armamentarium of the tenant-victim of
sexual assault by third-party assailants a tort-based negligence remedy against the landlord
arising from the tenant's reasonable reliance on an implied contractual representation of
protective security by the landlord, where the tenant's reliance is both reasonable and fore-
seeable and the tenant is harmed by landlord's negligent failure to do what was represented
or promised.
Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
105. Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 460 (Okla. 1986).
106. Id. at 458-59.
107. In Lay, the tenant-victim alleged that the landlords breached both the warranty made to the
general public and to herself to provide security, as well as the implied warranty of habitability.
However, the court rejected the breach of warranty theory as a basis for extending landlord liability
in cases where the tenant has been criminally injured by a third party:
To find a cause of action arising from the mere fact that appellees allegedly stated the
complex to be secure ... runs directly afoul of the factors which we considered in limiting
a landlord's possible tort liability by the application of traditional tort concepts ....
We also reject the concept that a statement regarding the security of a complex, in and
of itself, establishes a landlord's liability for criminal activites within the complex ....
Id. at 460 (emphasis added). The use of the words "stated" and "statement" above can only refer to
17
Petersen: The Landlord's Liability for Criminal Injuries--The Duty to Prote
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
both the landlord's general warranty to the public as well as the implied
warranty of habitability. 108 In rejecting the general warranty, the court
refused to consider that a landlord's "statement regarding the security of
the complex" might have a causal connection to the injury. To do so
would absolutely insure the tenant's safety.1"9 The court's rejection of
the general warranty theory maintains a balance of fairness for landlords
and tenants. On the other hand, the implied warranty of habitability
theory was overlooked in the Lay decision. 110
In Oklahoma's next major landlord liability decision, Mengel v. Ro-
sen," 1 the assailant gained access to an apartment using a key which the
tenant had left in the door. The court ruled that no breach of any duty
owed the tenant was the proximate cause of the injury. Rather, the op-
portunity to enter the tenant's apartment was afforded the intruder by
the tenant herself.I 2 In Mengel, therefore, the court did not apply Lay's
tort negligence duty analysis, although the court still referred to it as a
valid means of establishing the landlord's duty to protect the tenant.1 13
This time, the supreme court arrested the appellate court's attempt to
expand the landlord's statutory duty to maintain the premises to include
protection of tenants against criminal activities. Relying on Pippin and
other rulings, the court viewed the words "safe," "fit," and "habitable"
as imposing only a minimum duty of maintaining the premises.1 14
On the issue of warranties, the Mengel court relied on Lay's rejec-
tion of the general warranties due to the same lack of causation. 11  The
the express general warranties, and not the implied warranty of habitability because it was not ad-
dressed in the opinion.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 107.
111. 735 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1987).
112. Id. at 563.
113. Id. at 562.
114. Id. The Mengel court ruled that the words "safe," "fit," and "habitable," as used within
the context of such statutes as OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, §§ 101-135 (1981) (also known as the Oklahoma
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act), impose a minimum duty of maintenance only and do not
create a duty to protect tenants from criminals. The pertinent provisions state:
A. A landlord shall at all times during the tenancy:
1. Except in the case of a single-family residence, keep all common areas of his build-
ing, grounds, facilities and appurtenances in a clean, safe and sanitary condition;
2. Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the tenant's dwell-
ing unit and premises in afit and habitable condition; ....
OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 118 (1981) (emphasis added). The Mengel court, by limiting the statute's
applicability to physical conditions of the premises, rejected the violation of statute theory as a
means of extending the landlord's tort liability in Oklahoma. One might view this determination as
a tacit rejection of a statutory warranty of habitability imposing an obligation upon the landlord to
protect his tenants.
115. Mengel, 735 P.2d at 563.
[Vol. 24:261
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Mengel court may have chosen to overlook the Lay court's failure to
address implied warranty theory. Whether the court then tacitly rejected
the implied warranty theory within what appears to be a sweeping rejec-
tion of what the court termed as simply "warranty theory" is unclear.
The supreme court may have been reserving its acceptance of the implied
warranty theory until the future enactment of detailed safety codes and
regulations, similar to those in New Jersey, regarding the safety and se-
curity of multiple dwellings.1 16
For the time being, Oklahoma's modest expansion of landlord tort
liability to include that for criminally inflicted injuries, is couched in a
traditional tort negligence analysis. The Lay court, for the most part,
rejected those controversial theories that tend to tip the scales in favor of
either landlord or tenant. The fact that a jury determines the adequacy
of security measures after the measures have failed to deter a criminal
may not be fair to the landlord who has conscientiously endeavored to
render the premises safe. The Lay court noted this harsh reality and then
proceeded to reject the special relationship and general warranty theories
as being heavily weighted in favor of tenants." 7 In Mengel, the court
very possibly rejected the implied warranty theory. The Oklahoma stat-
ute, unlike the New Jersey statute in Trentacost, does not impose a duty
to provide protection and thus will not suffice as a statutory warranty of
habitability imposing such a duty. Finally, in the tenant's favor, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court apparently will not embrace the Pippin or
Feld theories of strict assumption of duty. On the contrary, the Lay
court treated the landlord's undertaking as a "contractual retention of
control" over the security aspects of the property." 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Most courts presently recognize that landlords have a duty to take
protective measures to deter criminal attacks against tenants on their
leased premises. Courts have gone to opposite extremes to protect either
the landlord's or the tenant's interests. Under the strict assumption of
duty theory, the tenant remains vulnerable to criminal attack because the
116. See supra note 89.
117. Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 459 (Okla. 1986).
118. Id. at 458. In Lay, the court imposed a duty to protect on the landlord who neither prom-
ised nor undertook to remedy the unsafe condition. Absolute nonfeasance infers negligence when
control is already contractually retained by the landlord. However, under the assumption of duty
theory, the absolute nonfeasor, or Kline "bystander," is the landlord who does nothing to deter
criminal activity on the property and gets away with it.
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landlord, fearing any affirmative action might prove negligent, refuses to
implement protective measures. Under the breach of implied warranty
theory, the landlord may be held responsible for repairing a tenant's in-
side window latch even though the tenant never brought the defect to the
landlord's attention. If failure to repair occasions a criminal intrusion
and attack, the landlord is liable for the tenant's injuries.
The traditional tort negligence analysis is the fairest and most effi-
cient means of approaching the issue of a landlord's liability to the tenant
for injuries inflicted by a third party criminal. In performing this analy-
sis, most courts will merge contract and tort law principles to find a land-
lord's duty to exercise reasonable care to secure the premises.
Oklahoma's coalescence of the duty to protect operates on the common
sense rationale that a landlord alone has the capacity to deter foreseeable
criminal intrusions and ought to do so. Oklahoma courts recognize that
a landlord contractually retains control over common areas and other
aspects of the leased premises. As a result, the landlord has a contractual
duty to take reasonable protective measures to deter criminal activities in
these areas. The landlord also has a tort-based duty which flows from
the landlord's knowledge of a dangerous condition or defect which might
enhance the likelihood of a criminal attack if uncorrected.
Legislatures should also play a major role in insuring a minimum
level of safety for tenants by enacting uniform codes which impose a duty
on landlords to provide basic security measures. However, crime levels
vary widely according to locale. A deadbolt lock may be an effective
crime deterrent on the east side of town whereas a guard service is re-
quired on the west side. Therefore, the language in the statute should
clearly specify not only the required security devices, but also inform
landlords that they are required to implement whatever additional secur-
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